Abstract. -The history of Nicaragua in the seventeenth century remains largely unexplored, in part because of a shortage of primary sources in Nicaragua itself. The colony's importance as a transit route for both Caribbean and Pacific coast trade made it an attractive target for Spain's rival powers. Spanish efforts to defend Nicaragua produced rich documentation which scholars can use to study not only military matters, but also aspects of the colony's political, social, and economic history. How this can be done is suggested by a case study of an inspection tour undertaken in 1672-1673 by don Fernando Francisco de Escobedo, captain-general of Guatemala from 1672 to 1678.
cific coast trade between New Spain and Peru.
2 Also, its superior system of navigable internal waterways formed by Lake Nicaragua and the San Juan River made it an ideal transit point from the Caribbean to the Pacific and, therefore, a strategically vulnerable position that had to be defended against a growing foreign presence in the region. 3 Because of the threat posed by the activities of pirates and other foreign interlopers, Nicaragua became a principal object of official attention both in Spain and in the Audiencia capital of Santiago de Guatemala. 4 For this reason, although local and national archives have largely succumbed to a variety of hazards, including war and earthquake, the documentation on military matters to be found in archives in Spain, and particularly in Seville's Archivo General de Indias, is relatively abundant. An extended analysis of one important series of such documents, the record of an inspection tour conducted in Nicaragua during 1672 and 1673 by the captain-general and president of the Audiencia of Guatemala, don Fernando Francisco de Escobedo (1672-1678), suggests ways in which research into isthmian defensive arrangements may help to shed light on Nicaraguan society as a whole.
5 By providing evidence on political, social, and economic conditions, the Escobedo materials open a window onto colonial society, suggesting ways in which we can learn more about local and regional political relationships, the special role of the port of Granada and the San Juan River, and the colonial economy of Nicaragua in general. . Among several short studies of Granada, see Carlos Meléndez Chaverri, "Historia más antigua de la ciudad de Granada en Nicaragua y de su fase de desarrollo como puerto del Caribe, 1524-1685": Revista del Archivo Nacional 63 (1999), p. 111-137. 4 For a general introduction to the topic see Stephen Webre, "La guerra y la política en la audiencia de Guatemala, siglo XVII": Beginning in the mid-sixteenth century, pirates were a frequent presence on the Caribbean coast of Central America, but it was only with the English seizure of Jamaica in 1655, followed by major assaults against Granada in 1665 and 1670, that official attention began to focus closely on Nicaragua.
6 Following the 1665 event, Captain-General don Martín Carlos de Mencos (1658-1667) ordered a reconnaissance of Granada and its approaches, which resulted in the construction of a wooden palisade on a site near the confluence of the San Juan with a tributary called the San Carlos, a river which arises in northern Costa Rica (see Map).
7 Located only sixteen leagues from the sea, the fort known as San Carlos was too far from Granada to be resupplied easily or to be relieved in case of trouble. It also appears to have been poorly maintained. Inspecting the site in 1668, Mencos's successor, don Sebastián Álvarez Alfonso Rosica de Caldas (1667-1670), reported that the timbers had rotted through and that the works at San Carlos were in a state of near collapse. The presence of a long boat constructed at Álvarez's direction may, as the captain-general later claimed, have helped to turn back a pirate attempt against San Carlos that same year, but by any measure, defensive preparations on the San Juan River remained inadequate. The new captain-general brought with him instructions, issued in Madrid in October, 1671, which, in essence, directed him to make the defense of Nicaragua his first priority. As soon as possible Escobedo was to visit that province to carry out a personal inspection of the strategic situation at Granada and on the San Juan River. Based on information forwarded by the viceroy of Mexico, don Antonio Sebastián de Toledo Molina y Salazar, marqués de Mancera (1664-1673), and by the bishop of Guatemala, don Juan de Santo Matía Sáenz Mañozca, interim president of the Central American Audiencia (1670-1672), the Crown specified that Escobedo was to arrange for the effective fortification of the mouth of the San Juan River. Although officials in Spain authorized Escobedo to draw on the royal treasury for this purposesomething they were not often willing to do -, they made it clear that any improvements in Nicaragua should be made as inexpensively as possible. 13 Given conditions of travel in Central America at the time, Escobedo's task, which called for a lengthy journey, would be difficult enough. As it turned out, it was made more challenging by the fact that the instructions he had received were based on inaccurate information on local conditions. Also, keeping costs to the Crown down would mean reliance on local resources, but Nicaragua was a poor province, little prepared to provide financial support for its own defense. 14 Escobedo requisitioned two long boats and a number of canoes from the pueblo of Posoltega, crossed Lake Nicaragua in command of a party of more than one hundred, and began his descent of the San Juan River.
15 After a thorough reconnaissance of the entire river to the point at which it emptied into the Caribbean, Escobedo returned to Granada at the end of February. Firmly convinced by his own observations as well as by the arguments of his advisors and of locally knowledgeable individuals that the colonial authorities in Spain who had mandated the fortification of the river's mouth were misinformed, he decided that the ideal place to build a stronghold was not where the San Juan joined the sea, but rather about twenty-six leagues upstream on the right bank, at a spot overlooking the Santa Cruz rapids. 16 The arguments in favor of ignoring royal orders and building at the Santa Cruz site were many: because the river had four mouths rather than one, as the Crown apparently believed, fortifying the Caribbean end of the San Juan route would be difficult and expensive; also, even if the mouths of the San Juan could be effectively fortified, supplying and reinforcing Spanish garrisons in such a forward position would be difficult because it would involve a lengthy traverse of sparsely settled territory. In the event of attack, it would take an unacceptably long time for the alarm to reach Granada or for relief to be sent. For the same reason, should an enemy actually seize the works at the river's mouth, it would prove relatively easy to hold them, effectively closing the river to Spanish commerce. By contrast, the Santa Cruz site offered a number of advantages: only ten leagues from the outlet of Lake Nicaragua, it was situated at less than a third of the distance from that point to the river's mouth; both communication and re-supply could be accomplished with greater speed and less expense, and there was good agri-cultural land nearby where soldiers of the garrison could settle their families and produce their own food crops. As a defensive position, it was difficult to improve upon the rapids, which were wide and shallow and possessed a current so strong that, according to contemporary estimates, it took Granada-bound boats from two to four hours to transit them. During this lengthy ascent, every hand aboard would be occupied with rowing, and any enemy vessel attempting to pass through would have to do so in full view of the fort, vulnerable to both cannon and harquebus fire.
17
To Escobedo and the many other knowledgeable persons involved, therefore, it was clear that what the Crown had directed the new captain-general to do in Nicaragua would not work. There could be no question of fortifying the mouth of the river, not only because to do so would be to betray Escobedo's own professional judgment, but also because, as he would be aware, even if he did implement the Crown's instructions to the letter, if a third assault against Granada then succeeded, as captain-general it would be he who had to take the blame. On the other hand, if Escobedo did what he knew to be best, ignored his orders, fortified the rapids at Santa Cruz, and then, despite his efforts, Granada fell anyway, it was equally certain that he would be called to account. As a political matter, what Escobedo needed was justification. To provide it, he employed a traditional Spanish bureaucratic practice: the ritual inscription in a permanent notarized record of as many authoritative opinions as possible.
As part of his record of proceedings, Escobedo sought to discredit the original order by calling into question the information on which it was based. References appear repeatedly to the fact that the recommendation to fortify the mouth of the San Juan came originally from an oidor of Guatemala named don Juan de Gárate y Francia, who had accompanied Captain-General Álvarez on his inspection tour in 1668 and who had later been transferred to the Audiencia of Mexico, where he shared his impressions with Viceroy Mancera, who in turn relayed them to the Crown. According to several witnesses whose statements appear in the record, during Álvarez's descent of the river, Gárate had turned back at the old fortress of San Carlos, returning to Granada without ac-tually visiting the river's mouth. For this reason, the oidor could have no first-hand knowledge of the site that he proposed to fortify. One person who stressed Gárate's ignorance of local conditions was landowner Francisco de Mena, whose hacienda on the shore of Lake Nicaragua often served as a staging area for military operations and who himself claimed more than forty years of experience on the river. Because he had been held hostage by the invaders during the 1665 assault on Granada, Mena could be expected to take the issue of riverine defense seriously. 18 According to Mena, Captain-General Álvarez had originally favored the Santa Cruz site but had encountered determined opposition at a council of war he summoned after his return to Granada. 19 Engineer Martín de Andújar, who had reconnoitered the river with both Álvarez and Escobedo, confirmed Mena's testimony and suggested that Gárate's informants were members of a cabal against Álvarez. 20 Certainly, Mena professed to believe that, in Álvarez's time, resistance at Granada to the Santa Cruz option was due to unspecified local interests ("por partticulares motivos"). Mena argued that the resulting delay in improving defenses on the San Juan had made possible the pirate raid of 1670. 21 Inevitably, given their purpose, the statements taken down by Escobedo's notary, Lorenzo de Montúfar, were repetitive in nature. Of greater interest, once one becomes familiar with the essential arguments in favor of the Santa Cruz site, are the witnesses themselves and what their testimony and circumstances tell us about life in seventeenth-century Nicaragua. 22 Among those who made their livelihoods on the river and whose expertise Escobedo sought was, for example, Francisco Romero, who stated that he was about thirty-five years old and that he had worked as a pilot for two decades. Unable to read or write, Romero nonetheless knew the San Juan well. He had been up and down it many times over the years, and he was intimately familiar with its various mouths and channels and the sand bars that lay at its approaches.
23 Much information about the latter came also from a literate thirty-five-year-old Canary Islander named Luis de Peralta Hidalgo, who worked as a coastal pilot. Escobedo encountered him in one of the river's mouths with two ships he had brought from Cartagena. 24 In addition to boatmen, Escobedo solicited statements from soldiers with river experience. Typical of these was Juan Romero Tamariz, captain of the paid infantry company at Granada. 25 Forty years of age and literate, Romero Tamariz affirmed that, since 1668, he had made a number of trips up and down the river providing armed escort to vessels making the transit. The information he was able to provide on the river and its mouths was similar to that given by the pilot Romero.
26
The same was true of Romero Tamariz's predecessor in the Granada command, Juan de Medina Coto, who stated that over a six-year period he had made frequent descents and ascents of the river escorting royal vessels, that he knew the river well, and that, in fact, he had made a map of it.
27 From the testimony of both the pilots and the soldiers, it appears that the San Juan River was a busier place than commonly thought. The port of Granada may well have been in decline in the second half of the seventeenth century because of pirate incursions and other factors, as is commonly claimed, but to all appearances, there continued to be frequent shipping activity.
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Defense, Economy, and Politics in Seventeeth-Century Nicaragua 23 "Testimonio de los Autos fhos en el Viaxe" (note 5), fols. 22v-24r. 24 Ibidem, fols. 24r-24v. 25 Most troops available in Central America at the time were volunteer militiamen. The Crown accepted the burden of salaried infantry only in places that were considered to be most vulnerable militarily, one of which, obviously, was Granada. See Stephen Webre, "Las compañías de milicia y la defensa del istmo centroamericano en el siglo XVII. El alistamiento general de 1673": Mesoamérica 14 (1987), p. 511-529.
26 "Testimonio de los Autos fhos en el Viaxe" (note 5), fols. 24v-25v. 27 Ibidem, fols. 25v-26r. 28 In addition to pirate activity in the Caribbean, traditional accounts have attributed the decline of the port of Granada to an earthquake that supposedly occurred in 1663 and which, it is claimed, raised the bed of the river in places. Meléndez Chaverri, "Historia más antigua de Granada" (note 3), p. 127-128 and 130-131, argues that there is no documentary foundation for this claim and that the decreasing navigability of the San Juan River in this era can be explained as the result of environmental degradation occasioned by logging and extended stockraising around Lake Nicaragua. According to Meléndez Chaverri, river-borne commerce adapted to this new state of affairs by shifting to flatbottomed boats. If Escobedo's report offers glimpses of political life at Granada and activity on the river, it also offers a suggestive window onto Nicaragua's colonial economy. Part of Escobedo's mission was to raise funds to finance the construction, maintenance, and garrisoning of the new defenses on the San Juan River. On his way to Granada from Guatemala, the captain-general stopped at major centers, where he mustered the militia companies to inspect personnel and weapons, and where he also summoned assemblies of prominent local residents to solicit pledges and donations. 29 As recorded by the notary Lorenzo de Montúfar, the initial response to such a request in every town was to allege general poverty, claiming an inability to contribute. Negotiations conducted at Sonsonate, in what is today El Salvador, on December 6, 1672, provided the pattern for every subsequent case. In what was apparently a familiar political ritual, the community leaders began by informing Escobedo that there were no resources available. Escobedo countered by reiterating the importance of defending the San Juan River and stressing the need to provide some assistance, if only from the residents' own pockets. At that point, "having cited the scarcity of their own fortunes, the state of need in which they found themselves, and the miserable condition of the town itself occasioned by lack of trade", the Sonsonatecos grudgingly agreed to contribute specific amounts individually by name, which Montúfar duly recorded. At the conclusion, Escobedo sealed the pact with an expression of gratitude for the sacrifice involved, essentially an affirmation of the original allegation of poverty.
30
Using the technique described above, Escobedo was able to secure pledges from Sonsonate totaling 334 pesos; from San Salvador totaling 683 pesos; from San Vicente totaling 342 pesos; and from San Miguel totaling 698 pesos. 31 Of course, these towns were in the relatively prosperous eastern districts of Guatemala, which corresponded
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Stephen Webre 29 Escobedo later required submission of formal written reports on the militia companies. His own detailed report to the Crown is analyzed in Webre, "Las compañías de milicia" (note 25).
30 "Testimonio de los Autos fhos en el Viaxe" (note 5), fols. 5r-6v. In the Spanish original, the quoted text reads "Y habiendo Representado los dhos la cortedad de sus caudales, la nezeçidad en que se hallaban y el miserable estado de dha villa por la falta del Comerçio Sin Embargo ofreçieron las cantidades siguientes". 31 Ibidem, fols. 7r-7v, 10r-11v and 13r-13v.
more or less to the modern republic of El Salvador. Once Escobedo reached Nicaragua proper, however, he found the task more difficult. There is no record that the captain-general even attempted to raise funds in León, the traditional seat of Spanish civil and ecclesiastical authority in colonial Nicaragua. Upon his arrival in January, 1673, Escobedo reported the inhabitants of that city to be divided into contentious factions. There had been a bitter dispute the previous year over municipal offices which had resulted in fines against a number of residents. Because of widespread poverty, Escobedo declared that there was no way these fines could be collected, and that any attempt to do so would only increase disharmony, which, given the foreign threat to the colony, was something to be avoided, if at all possible. As a consequence, Escobedo absolved the defendants of the obligation to pay the fines and moved on toward Granada.
32
At Granada, when Escobedo met with municipal leaders on March 7, 1673, they made the customary allegation of poverty, which was only to be expected, given that the city had been sacked twice by pirates in recent years. Even so, Escobedo's legal advisor, oidor don Jerónimo Gómez de Vega y Viga, made an impassioned plea, stressing both the financial burden borne by the Crown in defending Christendom around the world and the inherent fairness of the proposition that those who stood to benefit the most from the proposed defensive works should also contribute the most toward constructing them. In this case, local authorities committed themselves to raise 2,000 pesos as a collective effort. No individual subscriptions were recorded at this time, but two local cattle ranchers, Francisco de Mena and Juan Pérez de Guadamur, did offer to provide beef to feed construction workers at the Santa Cruz site. 33 Despite the hard times, local authorities apparently believed themselves able to raise, almost to the peso, the same amount that had been pledged by the inhabitants of the four Salvadoran towns put together.
Escobedo's effort in early March, 1673, to extract greater revenue from a duty imposed on Nicaraguan mules raised for export to Panama provided further indication of the relative vitality of the Granada economy. Levied originally in 1667 and dedicated to defense, over the intervening years the tax had yielded a total of 845 pesos and 4 reales, much less than Escobedo thought possible. What was more, collections had declined significantly since the 1670 raid. 34 Escobedo ordered that the contract to collect the duty be put up for public auction. Several bidders appeared, and there was a spirited competition. In the end, Escobedo awarded the contract to one don Juan de Betancourt, currently alcalde ordinario of Granada, who proposed to pay the Crown 700 pesos per year for a total of four years.
35 Shortly afterward, Betancourt petitioned to have the contract extended for a fifth year with the same annual payment; Escobedo readily agreed. 36 With these transactions, in the five years to come the export duty on mules was guaranteed to produce a total of 3,000 pesos, or more than quadruple the amount it had yielded during the previous six.
That despite some signs of economic vigor Granada did have problems is evidenced by a decree Escobedo issued on March 17. Escobedo noted that there was a shortage of African slave labor for Spanish estates, which made landowners heavily dependent upon labor from indigenous communities, which, in turn, were experiencing difficulty maintaining themselves. The city itself was in a state of deterioration, characterized by ruined buildings, many of which appeared to be near collapse. According to Escobedo, the city's condition was due not so much to the immediate physical impact of the two pirate raids as to the disruption and dislocation they had caused. In an attempt to correct some of Granada's problems, Escobedo ordered the apprehension and return to their communities of fugitive natives, except those working voluntarily for wages on Spanish landholdings, who were to remain undisturbed because of the need for their labor. 37 
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Stephen Webre 34 "Testimonio de los Autos fhos en el Viaxe" (note 5), fols. 55r and 57v-58r. 35 Ibidem, fols. 55r-57v. 36 Ibidem, fols. 58r-59r. 37 Of course, the defensive works at the Santa Cruz rapids would also consume native labor. Francisco de Fletes, who contracted to supply lime to the building site, stipulated that he would require the services of forty native men and six native women per week. Escobedo directed that these workers be supplied to Fletes from the pueblos of Jinotepe, Diriamba, Masatepe, Diriá, Diriomo, and Niquinohomo. Ibidem, fol. 66r. Native communities also contributed maize from their harvests to support the war effort. Ibidem, fols. 66r-66v.
The captain-general also directed that draft native labor be made available to property owners who proposed to make needed repairs or improvements on buildings in Granada itself. 38 One Nicaraguan regional center that was not on Escobedo's personal itinerary was Nueva Segovia (modern Ciudad Antigua). Although he did not visit the town, the captain-general did send instructions to municipal authorities there to solicit bids for a contract to supply troops with flour and hardtack, and also to summon the more prosperous inhabitants to make pledges of material support for the San Juan River fortification. 39 An agricultural community, Nueva Segovia produced wheat for local consumption and regional markets, and it also collected pine pitch for export to the shipyards of the Viceroyalty of Peru, where it was used for caulking and waterproofing. 40 Although its remote location appeared to make it less vulnerable to attack than Granada, it was not as prosperous as that city, and it did not prove easy to separate Nueva Segovians from their assets. For example, in late March and early April, 1673, bidding for the contract to supply the troops was cried publicly in the town square for nine days in a row, without a single potential concessionaire coming forward. 41 Escobedo had stipulated that, in such a case, the needed supplies would be requisitioned from the inhabitants on a rotation basis, so this, presumably, is what was done. 42 Similarly, the municipal authorities of Nueva Segovia found it difficult to achieve the needed attendance at the meeting called to discuss donations. Alcalde ordinario Nicolás Romero de Mendoza reported that many local residents had left town for Holy Week and that he had sent messengers to the native communities of Palacagüina, Tepesomoto, and Totecacinte, all of which were apparently favorite seasonal refuges for Spanish settlers, warning of a twenty-five-peso fine for failure to appear. 43 When the residents did appear to make their pledges, none offered cash donations. Rather, Romero de Mendoza recorded promises to provide more than thirty tons of pitch, almost two tons of flour, and more than four hundred pounds of sugar, as well as thirteen mules. 44 The challenge faced by Escobedo in Nicaragua's cash-poor economy was to convert this large quantity of donations in kind into money that could be deposited in the treasury account for the fortification of the San Juan. The key to this transaction lay in the Pacific coast port of El Realejo (near modern Corinto), where the captain-general arrived during the first week of April.
Just as León, Granada, and Nueva Segovia each presented its own peculiar conditions, so did El Realejo. 45 Most, or all, of the pitch pledged at Nueva Segovia was destined to be transported there for shipment to El Callao in Peru, but Pacific exports apparently were not thriving at that time. When Escobedo summoned local residents to solicit their pledges in support of the San Juan defenses, they were quick to respond with the customary disclaimer, citing the port's general poverty, for which they blamed "the lack of trade with the Kingdom of Peru". 46 There was more cash available at El Realejo than there had been at Nueva Segovia, but, apparently, not much more. Escobedo recorded money pledges in the amount of 210 pesos, of which one hundred were offered by the governor of Nicaragua, don Francisco Antonio de Rivas, who agreed to have the sum deducted from his salary. 47 In addition to this modest amount of specie, the inhabitants of El Realejo pledged to provide more than eleven tons of pitch, to add to the thirty tons offered by their counterparts at Nueva Segovia. 48 Unlike the pledges of flour, sugar, and livestock received at Nueva Segovia, which could be converted into cash or negotiable credits in local markets, or, failing that, put to use to supply troops at Granada or at the works on the San Juan, the enormous quantity of pitch promised by inhabitants of Nueva Segovia and El Realejo presented a significant problem. It was up to Escobedo to make the most advantageous deal possible on this commodity, but there was no demand in Nicaragua for it, and currently little even in Peru. 49 Ultimately, the captain-general's solution was to borrow 649 hundredweight (quintales) of pitch from the El Realejo agent of the wealthy Guatemala merchant José Agustín de Estrada. Escobedo proposed to ship this consignment to El Callao aboard a vessel belonging to one Andrés Márquez de Gazetta, at that moment prepared to depart for the Peruvian port and then to reimburse Estrada by delivering to his agent the pitch being transported from Nueva Segovia. For his services in carrying the pitch to Peru, Márquez would be compensated at the rate of 2 pesos per hundredweight, which Escobedo calculated would leave the Crown a profit of 4 reales per hundredweight to be deposited in the account for the defense of Granada. 50 The fact that the cost of freight would account for four-fifths of the expected selling price in Peru suggests how depressed the Pacific coast trade in pitch had become in the 1670s.
The record of Escobedo's visit to Nicaragua does not indicate whether his transaction in pitch was ultimately successful or not, but, following a brief reconnaissance of the port of El Realejo and its approaches in the company of the engineer Andújar, Escobedo finally departed the province, continuing on to Tegucigalpa, Honduras, and the port of Santo Tomás de Castilla on the Caribbean, before returning to Guatemala on May 28, 1673. 51 Construction on Escobedo's fortification at the Santa Cruz rapids went forward. Ultimately known as the Castillo de la Inmaculada Concepción, by 1675 this stronghold was sufficiently complete to block further assaults on Granada via the San Juan River. However, pirates simply sought out other targets: for example, the following year foreigners who had been squatting in the Jamastrán Valley of Honduras attacked Nueva Segovia, while another band assaulted the Caribbean zone of Matina in Costa Rica. Meanwhile, enemy ships became so common along the Caribbean coast that, although Granada was now well defended from threats from that direction, Nicaragua remained effectively cut off from Atlantic trade. 52 Piratical activity also increased in the Pacific. In 1685, despite its impressive defenses on the San Juan, Granada fell to an assault from the south. 53 For his part, back in Guatemala, Escobedo continued to work energetically on the problem of territorial defense, but he was not immune to the common nuisances of colonial politics. By the end of his time in office, he was under investigation for corruption. In 1678, Escobedo returned to Spain to serve as grand prior of Castile in the Order of Malta, to which he belonged. 54 Escobedo is reported to have died in Spain in 1688. 55 There is much more material on the defense of Nicaragua to be read and analyzed, but of itself the record of Escobedo's visit reveals much about seventeenth-century realities in the province, and its study suggests a number of paths to be followed in subsequent research. Certainly, there is the possibility of yet another case study of bureaucratic politics at the intersection between grand imperial design and local interests, in this instance given specificity by the fact that the negotiation took place in an environment of imminent danger. In this regard, something can be learned both from the debate over the site to be fortified and from the elaborate arrangements needed to extract financial and other material contributions from Spanish settlers. The Escobedo materials also suggest what defense-related documents may teach us about local conditions. For example, a significant quarrel had occurred at León. The details have proven elusive to date, but it is clear that the municipal leaders of that city were grateful to Escobedo for his generous treatment of them. 56 A better understanding of colonial politics may well come from rescuing from obscurity a conflict whose effect on this particular community was so divisive that the need to resolve it justified the exemption of local elites from the collective obligation to contribute to regional defense.
Because of its emphasis on mobilizing the resources necessary to finance construction and maintain troops, the record of Escobedo's visit to Nicaragua is also rich in observations on the local economy. The effect of piracy on Granada and the Caribbean trade is an important question, and there is anecdotal evidence here to suggest that it was not as great as many have thought, and,also that the impact that did occur was due less to destruction wrought by the attackers than to musters, deployments, and evacuations carried out in response to aggression. The ease with which Escobedo found personnel with experience of navigation on the river and along the Caribbean coast suggests that, although it may not have been as vigorous as it once had been, commerce from Granada continued to operate. The traffic in mules to Panama still appears to have been profitable, and in general, the economy of the Granada region appears to have been capable of contributing significantly in manpower, funds, and supplies to the defense of the San Juan Valley. Similar documents promise to yield more information on economic activities around the lake, as well as on native communities and their trade and labor relations with Spanish settlers.
Judging from information provided on El Realejo and Nueva Segovia, the Pacific coast trade with Peru was in decline during this period. This would have been due to factors other than piracy, although contemporaries did not fail to cite the depredations of foreign enemies in their complaints. 57 As the Spanish defensive position on the San Juan River solidified, the external threat shifted from the Caribbean to the Pacific. As a consequence, both the port town and the inland agricultural center themselves became more vulnerable to attack. Details from records dating from the next two decades or so should assist in integrating the experience of these two communities more firmly into the larger story of Nicaragua in the seventeenth century.
